SMU Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 3 Survey of Texas Law for the Year 1948

Article 12

January 1949

Domestic Relations
James D. Byrom

Recommended Citation
James D. Byrom, Domestic Relations, 3 SW L.J. 349 (1949)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol3/iss3/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

19491

SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1948

tentions of defendant that it was never his intention that plaintiff
was ever to own the stock. The Court of Civil Appeals in the 1946
case found little authority directly, or even closely, in point, but
said:
"As between the transferor and transferee, it seems to be the rule that
transfer of title may take place though there is no delivery of the certificates themselves, nor endorsement of them, nor transfer of them on the
books of the corporation, and even though sale be by parol. The ques-

tion is whether the minds of the transferor and transferee met, whether
there was an intention that the stock should then and there be vested
in the transferee and whether there were acts in the nature of a sym'29
bolical delivery of the property.
The most interesting thing about this case was the sparsity of
evidence showing that plaintiff owned the stock. Nothing in the
decisions indicated the status of the stock during the life of the
old corporation. Nothing is mentioned as to whether the plaintiff
received dividends, or that any dividends were declared. Under
this decision the law seems to be that an affirmative listing of
stockholders shares in minutes of stockholder's meeting is sufficient
to sustain ownership between transferor and transferor, if there is
evidence of intent to make a present transfer of title.
Hoyt D. Howard.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CHILD CUSTODY

D

IFFICULT jurisdictional problems arise out of change of
residence of minor children, particularly where the child has
been removed from a state contrary to a judicial order of the state,
and the jurisdiction of the state where the child removed may be
involved.
"The subject matter involved in a proceeding to determine the
29]94

S. W. (2d) 134, 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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question of custody of minor children ... is the children themselves."' A proceeding to determine custody of a minor child partakes of the nature of an action in rem, the res being the child's
status or his legal relationship to another.'
Collaterally, the problem has arisen as to what action may be
taken against a parent who has removed a child contrary to the
order of a court of the state.
As early as 1894 in Legate v. Legate,3 the Supreme Court of
Texas ruled that the state has the right in proper cases to deprive
the parent of custody of the child, and that the welfare of the child
itself is the basis of this power or jurisdiction. In its latest decision
on this principle, the Court in Wicks v. Cox4 said:
"The principle underlying jurisdiction of the subject matter in child
custody cases is the welfare of society, primarily as evidenced by the
welfare of the child, but also the right, and... duty of a state to look
after the welfare of individuals within its borders-whether within or
without the scope of the full faith and credit clause of the federal
constitution."' 5
In the Wicks case, the mother of the minor child had lived in
Virginia; her husband had deserted her, and she had abandoned
the child. A probation officer had, on his own authority, placed the
child with plaintiff, a stranger, who had cared for the child for
some four years. In the meantime the mother obtained a divorce
and remarried. The mother then moved to Texas. She went to
Virginia and by a ruse got possession of the child and returned to
Texas. The plaintiff in this case brings a habeas corpus action for
the return of the child.
The court held that a technical legal domicile of a child in this
state is not essential to give the court jurisdiction where both the
child and the parties are before the court. It must be noted that in
1 Dorman v. Friendly, 176 Fla. 732, 734, 1 So. (2d) 734, 736 (1941).

2 State. ex ret Larson v. Larson. 190 Minn. 489, 490. 252 N. W. 329, 330 (1934).

S87 Tex. 423. 28 S. W. 281 (1894).
4

Tex .-.
-......
208 S. W. (2d) 876 (19481

5 Id. at ........
208 S. W. (2d) 876, 878.
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the case there was no judicial termination in Virginia of paternal
rights and no adoption of the child by the plaintiff.
In Ex parte DeWess,6 a collateral problem was presented as to
what extent a court could take jurisdiction of an adult who had
removed a child contrary to an order of court. In this case the
husband in a divorce action in the District court was awarded
custody of the child. The case was appealed and before decision
of the Court of Civil Appeals the wife's mother by adoption, with
whom the child had been domiciled and who was a party to the
suit, removed the child to Oklahoma. In Oklahoma, the wife's
mother instituted an action in the Oklahoma District Court for
custody of the child. The wife entered an interpleader asking for
joint custody of the child. The husband was personally served in
Texas with an Oklahoma citation. He ignored the citation and did
not appear. Meanwhile the Court of Civil Appeals in Valentine v.
Valentine,7 affirmed the order of the District Court giving custody
of the child to the husband. Nevertheless, the Oklahoma court
awarded custody jointly to the wife and the wife's mother by
adoption, on the ground of change of circumstances. The wife, who
had remarried, remained in Texas, and the child in Oklahoma.
Contempt proceedings were instituted against the wife in Texas
for wilful violation of the order of the court awarding custody of
the child to the husband, and ordered that she be imprisoned until
the child was returned to the jurisdiction of the court.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that under
this order there was a possibility of life imprisonment for the
wife, and that by statute' punishments in civil contempt cases were
limited to a fine of $100 and imprisonment not to exceed 3 days.
The Court reasoned that where it was not within the power of the
person to perform an act that would purge him of the contempt,
the court is without power to imprison him for an indefinite term,
and pointed out that in this case the mother, had actual control of
6-----------Tex..............- 210 S. W. (2d) 145 (1948).
T

203 S. W. (2d) 693 (Tex. Civ. App., 1947).
REv. CrV. STAT. (Vernon. 1948) art. 1911.

8 Tax.
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the child, and might or might not come to the rescue of her
daughter.
It seems clear that in the Wicks case the court properly asserted
jurisdiction since the legal status of the mother and child had
never been severed by judicial action, even though they were actually domiciled in different states.
The collateral problem presented by the DeWees case is more
difficult. "It is established by the great weight of authority that...
a decree of divorce awarding the custody of a child of the marriage must be given full force and effect in other states as to the
right to the custody of the child at the time and under the circumcumstances of its rendition." 9 A subsequent change in circumstances may justify a change in custody, on the basis of the welfare of the child, and such is the law in Oklahoma.' Since, then
the Oklahoma District Court based its decree on the basis of a
change in circumstances following the Texas court order, its judgment was valid on its face.
A quite different solution to this problem was found in the
Washington case of In re Penner." There the wife had brought the
child to Washington from Montana in violation of an order of the
Montana court. The Washington Court excused itself from exercising jurisdiction, while not denying it, and ordered the wife to
return to Montana with the child, so that the question of change of
circumstances as justifying a change in custody might be considered by the court Which first handled the matter.
Texas has in the past followed the same doctrine as Oklahoma.
In Wilson v. Elliot, 2 the court held that evidence as to conditions
existing prior to the granting of the custody decree by the court
of a sister state would not be admissible, but that the court could
9Note, A. L R. 815 (1918).
10 Chapman v. Walker. 144 Okla. 83. 289 Pac. 740 (1930).
11161 Wash. 479, 297 Pac. 757 (1931).
1232 Tex. Civ. App. 483, 75 S. W. 368 (1902), afirmed; 7 Tex. 238, 73 S. W. 946
(1903).

1949]

SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1948

353

hear evidence as to change in conditions after rendition of the
decree which, if sufficient, might support a change in custody.
DIVORCE

As early as 1891 the Supreme Court of Texas indicated that in
a divorce action based on the ground of cruel treatment plaintiff
was entitled to a jury finding on each allegation of cruelty." The
court now holds that where a divorce action is based upon excesses,
cruel treatment, or outrages of such nature to render living together insupportable, 14 the ultimate issue in the case is whether
the acts complained of render further living together insupportable, and a single special issue properly may be submitted to the
jury.15
In Howell v. Howell, the plaintiff wife complained of several
independent acts of the defendent husband in suing for divorce on
the ground of cruel treatment. She asked for special issues on each
of these independent acts of cruelty charged to the husband. The
lower court refused the request and sent the case to the jury on a
single special issue which instructed the jury that if it found from
a preponderance of the evidence that the acts complained of rendered further living together of the parties insupportable, the jury
should find for the plaintiff. Judgment being against plaintiff, she
appealed, assigning as error the trial court's refusal of her request
for special issues on each of the acts on which the complaint was
based. In answering a question certified to it by the Court of Civil
Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed the submission of the case in
the single issue, holding that plantiff was not entitled to a special
issue on each independent act, as the ultimate issue to be considered under Article 4629 (1)16 is "the total effect of defendant's
conduct considered in the light of all of the evidence." 17
James C. Byrom.
13

Trigg v. Trigg, 18 S. W. 3i3 (1891).

14 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4629 (1).

15 Howell v. Howell --.....
Tex.
210 S. W. (2d) 978 (1948).
16 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4629 (1).
17 Howell v. Howell,
Tex -..........----........
,--210 S. W. (2d) 978, 980 (1948).

